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Ambiente geostrategico: complessità, giudizio storico, scenari (9 agosto 2022 AM) – Geostrategic environment: complexity, historical judgment, scenarios (9 august 2022 AM)

Riprendiamo dal think tank Atlantic Council a proposito dell’Inflation Reduction Act: The unexpected Inflation Reduction Act proposes, among numerous other climate provisions, consumer tax credits for electric vehicle (EV) purchases. The credits aim to make EVs more affordable, but their greatest impact lies in their requirement that a proportion of the battery minerals in qualifying vehicles must have been extracted or processed in the United States or free trade partner countries. EV consumer tax credits will increase producer demand for new sources of battery metals to capitalize on the provision. The credits therefore tie the future of domestic EV sales to investments in alternative mineral supply chains. Prove di una nuova globalizzazione in un Occidente (Stati Uniti in testa) che si riconfigura in funzione anti-cinese.

Anche il think tank  CSIS ne scrive, in termini ancora più chiari: This column is a bit overtaken by events, as it concerns the reconciliation bill, which the Senate passed over the weekend. However, the issue the bill raises—electric vehicle (EV) tax credits—is not going to go away, and it presents another interesting trade dilemma where opposing policy goals once again butt heads. In brief, the bill continues the existing $7,500 tax credit for EVs but makes a number of changes regarding which vehicles can qualify for it. Final assembly would have to occur in the United States. Half the credit ($3,750) would be available if a percentage of the critical minerals contained in the car’s battery were extracted or processed in a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement or is recycled in North America. That percentage starts at 40 in 2023 and works its way up to 80 by 2027. The other half of the credit would be available if the value of components in the battery manufactured or assembled in North America exceeds a required percentage, starting at 50 percent in 2023 and rising to 100 percent by 2029. In addition, there would be no credit for a vehicle whose battery inputs are sourced or made in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. The intent of these conditions is clearly to promote North American production and assembly, preferably in the United States, and to eliminate reliance on Chinese critical minerals and components. Se, da un lato, è giusto avvicinare i luoghi della produzione di materie prime sensibili, l’autosufficienza è la scelta migliore in chiave strategica ?

L’autosufficienza, secondo noi, è la scelta strategica di chi non sceglie il dialogo politico-strategico. In gioco c’è il futuro della globalizzazione. Se, come alcuni sostengono, la globalizzazione che conoscevamo è finita con la guerra in Ucraina, l’inter-in-dipendenza prosegue. Ci interessa il tema delle società aperte che potranno continuare a esistere solo in un contesto di dialogo, di costruzione continua di alleanze sulle grandi questioni che riguardano il pianeta. Sentiamo spesso parlare di interesse nazionale e ci domandiamo come esso debba essere ri-pensato in chiave complessa e dentro il quadro geostrategico della glocalizzazione. Anziché, come accade, continuare a pensarlo dentro l’anti-storica competizione tra mondi-in-difesa.

Senza dialogo, il gioco è chiaro: tutti lavorano a salvare se stessi ma l’obiettivo non potrà essere raggiunto senza assumere strategicamente il destino del pianeta (glocalizzazione).

English version

From the think tank Atlantic Council about the Inflation Reduction Act: The unexpected Inflation Reduction Act proposes, among numerous other climate provisions, consumer tax credits for electric vehicle (EV) purchases. The credits aim to make EVs more affordable, but their greatest impact lies in their requirement that a proportion of the battery minerals in qualifying vehicles must have been extracted or processed in the United States or free trade partner countries. EV consumer tax credits will increase producer demand for new sources of battery metals to capitalize on the provision. The credits therefore tie the future of domestic EV sales to investments in alternative mineral supply chains. Evidence of a  West (United States in the lead) that tries to reconfigure itself in an anti-Chinese function.

The think tank CSIS also writes about it, in even clearer terms: This column is a bit overtaken by events, as it concerns the reconciliation bill, which the Senate passed over the weekend. However, the issue the bill raises — electric vehicle (EV) tax credits — is not going to go away, and it presents another interesting trade dilemma where opposing policy goals once again butt heads. In brief, the bill continues the existing $ 7,500 tax credit for EVs but makes a number of changes regarding which vehicles can qualify for it. Final assembly would have to occur in the United States. Half the credit ($ 3,750) would be available if a percentage of the critical minerals contained in the car’s battery were extracted or processed in a country with which the United States has a free trade agreement or is recycled in North America. That percentage starts at 40 in 2023 and works its way up to 80 by 2027. The other half of the credit would be available if the value of components in the battery manufactured or assembled in North America exceeds a required percentage, starting at 50 percent in 2023 and rising to 100 percent by 2029. In addition, there would be no credit for a vehicle whose battery inputs are sourced or made in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. The intent of these conditions is clearly to promote North American production and assembly, preferably in the United States, and to eliminate reliance on Chinese critical minerals and components. If, on the one hand, it is right to bring the places of production of sensitive raw materials closer together, is self-sufficiency the best strategic choice?

In our opinion, self-sufficiency is the strategic choice of those who do not choose the political-strategic dialogue. The future of globalization is at stake. If, as some argue, globalization we knew ended with the war in Ukraine, inter-in-dependence continues. We are interested in the issue of open societies that will be able to continue to exist only in a context of dialogue, of continuous building of alliances on the great issues that affect the planet. We often hear about national interest and we ask ourselves how it should be re-thought in a complex way and within the geostrategic framework of glocalization. Instead, as it happens, keep thinking about it within the anti-historical competition between worlds-in-defense.

Without dialogue, the game is clear: everyone works to save themselves but the goal cannot be achieved without strategically assuming the fate of the planet (glocalization).

Riflessioni collegate

FROM GLOBAL THINK TANKS – DAILY NEWSLETTER

with The Science of Where Magazine

AROUND THE WORLD

Africa

Australia – China

China

  • August 8, 2022. Ryan Hass, Brookings. Astark contrast in narratives about China’s future is emerging inside and outside of China. This is partly a function of the dramatic constriction in the flow of people and ideas into and out of China, owing to China’s COVID-19 quarantine requirements. There also are fewer foreign journalists in China to help the outside world make sense of developments. Those foreign journalists and diplomats who are in China often are limited in where they can travel and who they can meet. There also is tighter technological control over information inside China than at any point since the dawn of the internet age. Implications for Taiwan of the divergence in narratives on China’s future

Indonesia

  • August 9, 2022.  and , The Strategist. After days of intense negotiations with the Indonesian government, Alphabet, Meta and more than 9,000 technology firms—8,900 of which are local—finally complied with Indonesia’s new licensing regulations last month to avoid being banned from operating in one of the world’s largest and most dynamic internet economies. Meanwhile, some companies that failed to meet the deadline (including Steam and PayPal) faced a nasty surprise in late July when they were temporarily blocked from their hundreds of thousands—if not millions—of users in Indonesia. Indonesia’s controversial tech licensing scheme

Japan

  • August 9, 2022. Richard Katz, East Asia Forum. Making Japan a start-up nation again, as in the Sony and Honda days, was a major goal of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s ‘new capitalism’. Unfortunately, like many of his predecessors, Kishida has failed to back his lofty goals with the measures needed to realise them. Restoring Japan as a start-up nation

Kyrgyzstan

MENA Region

Moldova

  • August 8, 2022. Vladimir Socor, The Jamestown Foundation. Moldova’s Russophile parties aim to force snap parliamentary and presidential elections this year, capitalizing on an unprecedented economic crisis to topple the pro-Western leadership (see EDM, August 4). Pro-Russia Parties Resurgent in Moldova (Part Two)

Philippines

  • August 9, 2022. Andrea Chloe Wong, The Interpreter. In a June resolution, the International Criminal Court prosecutor Karim Khan asked to resume an investigation into former president Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs, which was deferred in November 2021 at the request of the Philippine government. Government data has revealed at least 6,000 people were killed during anti-drug operations by the police across Duterte’s term from 2016 to 2022. But human rights groups believe that this number did not include victims of vigilante-style killings, raising the estimated toll to between 12,000 and 30,000 deaths.  ICC pushes probe on the Philippines’ drug war

Russia – Ukraine (on the ground & impact)

  • August 8, 2022. Layne Philipson, Katherine Lawlor, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan, ISW. Western and Ukrainian outlets circulated a report, likely false, of a Russian general allegedly threatening to destroy Europe’s largest nuclear facility, the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), if Russia could not hold the plant.Multiple news outlets shared a screenshot from the Russian social networking site Vkontakte that claimed to cite the Russian head of the Zaporizhia occupation garrison, Major General Valery Vasilev, stating that Russia had mined the Zaporizhzhia NPP and that the plant would be “either Russian land or a scorched desert.”. The screenshot appeared to be a news report posted in a Vkontakte group run by Russian outlet Lenta Novosti Zaporizhia. The outlet itself claimed that the screenshot was from a faked group and denied writing the report. The Russian Ministry of Defense condemned the report and screenshot as a “fake” and claimed that Vasilev was in Uzbekistan at the time he was purported to have made the statement to forces at Zaporizhzhia. Regardless of the origin (or existence) of the original post, the reporting is unreliable. It is indirect and does not claim to cite an official statement or a statement made on any official Russian news or government website. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 8

Taiwan

  • August 9, 2022. John Culver, The Interpreter. It’s a weird crisis,if it can be called that. Foreign reactions, and even those in Taiwan, to China’s unprecedented military drills in recent days have been a collective yawn. It’s as if the region and world settled in for a new season of a favourite action television series, “Missile Mayhem on the Straits!”, and were underwhelmed: “I mean, the special effects were good, but pretty much the same as season one, and I don’t like the character development … and the US spent the whole episode doing its nails!”. When serious, careful US management of China–Taiwan policies … isn’t
  • August 9, 2022. , The Strategist. Like his strategic partner Vladimir Putin in his horrific war in Ukraine, Xi Jinping’s violently aggressive actions in the past few days against Taiwan—and Japan—have revealed how he wants to act in the world. Taiwan shows a tango of engagement and deterrence against isolation and coercion
  • August 8, 2022. Swaran Singh and Yves Tiberghien, East Asia Forum. There is plenty of blame to go around for the apparent fourth Taiwan Straits crisis of August 2022. Intensely partisan US politics have taken the liberal international order for a dangerous ride. Increasingly nationalistic politics in China have produced assertive foreign policy behaviour and in the age of social media, emotions across the Pacific are boiling over. Pelosi’s visit could derail US–China compromise over Taiwan
  • August 8, 2022. CSIS. As U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi traveled to Taiwan on August 2-3, China responded with forceful and coercive military, economic, and diplomatic measures. Developments are still unfolding, but the large-scale and unprecedented military exercises taken by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) far exceed the operations China engaged in during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis that took place in 1995-1996. Chinese escalation has precipitated the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, leading to international calls for China to immediately halt its military activities.  Tracking the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis (Updated)

USA

  • August 8, 2022. Nasiha Salwati and David Wessel, Brookings. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), also known as the bipartisan infrastructure bill, will increase federal spending on infrastructure by about $550 billion over the next decade, nearly all through grants to state and local governments, which own much of the nation’s infrastructure. At our annual Municipal Finance Conference in July 2022, four experts addressed several questions about the IIJA: Ryan Berni, senior advisor to Mitch Landrieu, the infrastructure implementation coordinator in the White House; D.J. Gribbin, former special assistant to President Trump for infrastructure; Shoshana Lew, executive director of the Colorado Department of Transportation; and Eden Perry, head of the U.S. Public Finance Operation and S&P Global Ratings. Four questions (and answers) about the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act

TOPICS

Climate Change & Sustainability

Cybersecurity – Defense – Military – Security – Space

Global Governance & Economy 

  • August 8, 2022. M. Ayjan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, Naotaka Sugawara, World Bank blogs. Emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) saw their fiscal space eroded significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic (Global Economic Prospects 2021). In the subsequent strong growth rebound of 2021, their fiscal positions improved. However, they now face a considerable risk of financial market stress accompanied by a sharp global downturn as major advanced-economy central banks increase policy interest rates to bring inflation back to target from multi-decade highs (Global Economic Prospects 2022; “Global Stagflation,” Discussion Paper, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, 2022). Economic slowdowns may need to be smoothed with fiscal support measures and rising borrowing costs and currency depreciations may test governments’ ability to fund financing needs on sustainable terms.  Fiscal space watch: No time to sit on laurels
  • August 8. Luis C. Blancas, World Bank blogs. Dozens of vessels queuing up at the world’s largest maritime ports. A shortage of shipping containers, dockworkers, warehousing operators, and truck drivers. Factory closures across Asia’s manufacturing landscape. Significantly longer supplier delivery times. Higher fuel prices. A persistent consumption shift away from services and toward goods, increasingly delivered at customers’ doorsteps through e-commerce in the high-income markets of North America, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia. Significantly more expensive transport and logistics services, which eventually made their way into overall inflation—and therefore into ordinary people’s daily lives.  Logistics Clusters in the Era of Disruption