Geostrategic magazine

Geostrategic magazine (22 febbraio 2023 AM)

  • Elezioni nigeriane del 2023: Sviluppo democratico e frammentazione politica (IFRI, Sa’eed Husaini). Nigerians will go to the polls on February 25 to elect a new president and members of the National Assembly. This marks the 7th in unbroken sequence of presidential elections held since the country’s return to democracy in 1999.  Nigeria’s 2023 Election: Democratic Development and Political Fragmentation
  • Decolonizzazione e impegno nell’Artico: un’analisi critica dello sviluppo delle risorse nell’Artico statunitense (The Arctic Institute, ). An estimated 10 percent of the nearly four million residents throughout the entire Arctic region are Indigenous. Indigenous populations have inhabited much of the Arctic for thousands of years, long before the land was claimed and divided into nation-states. Interest in opportunities for natural resource extraction drove the historic colonization in the Arctic and, today, the increasing accessibility of minerals and oil due to climate change is fuelling the so-called “Arctic resource boom”—a quest to find and exploit the region’s remaining resources. As more international players hope to participate in Arctic affairs, it is critical to not only consider how these ventures impact Indigenous populations but to prioritize decolonization in these spaces.  Decolonization and Arctic Engagement: A Critical Analysis of Resource Development in the US Arctic
  • Un intenso fine settimana di test missilistici in Corea del Nord (CSIS, Victor Cha, Ellen Kim). North Korea launched a Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Saturday.  A Busy Weekend of Missile Tests in North Korea
  • Le forze antiterrorismo indonesiane arrestano i membri del JI e del JAD (The Jamestown Foundation, Jacob Zenn). On February 9, Indonesia announced the elite counter-terrorism force Densus 88 arrested six Jemaa Islamiya (JI) members in South Sumatra, Jakarta, and Cirebon, a city in West Java (, February 9). The six-member cell was among the more expansive JI networks found in recent years, although its dismantling by Densus 88 demonstrates how the elite force has gained the upper hand against JI.  Brief: Indonesian Counter-Terrorism Force Detains JI and JAD Remnants
  • I colloqui di pace thailandesi proseguono tra gli attacchi del gruppo militante Anonymous (The Jamestown Foundation, Jacob Zenn). The southern Thai ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency is comprised of various factions with similar goals, aiming collectively to achieve either autonomy or independence from Thailand and implement Islamic law. However, only one faction has consistently been committed to engaging with the Thai government through ongoing peace talks—the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN). This group is the largest and likely the most organized of all the insurgent groups and has participated in five rounds of peace talks since they first began in 2020 (, January 25).  Brief: Thai Peace Talks Continue Amid Anonymous Militant Group Attacks
  • Bangladesh. Reclutamento e radicalizzazione in carcere (The Jamestown Foundation, Shafi Md Mostofa). On January 24, 2023, Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) announced that “during [a prisoner named] Ranbir’s stay in jail, he interacted with some arrested militants at various times. Among those he came in contact with were top leaders of Jamatul Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB)” (, January 25). RAB’s spokesperson added that Ranbir joined JMB after receiving bail and leaving jail. Ranbir went on to help found Jamatul Ansar al-Hindal Sharkiya. Ranbir’s case suggests that the Bangladeshi prison system has fundamental flaws, having produced a series of militant leaders and foot soldiers.  Recruitment and Radicalization Behind Bars in Bangladesh
  • Il riemergere del gruppo di controspionaggio jihadista in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Khorasan (The Jamestown Foundation, Abdul Basit). On January 5, two officials from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Naveed Sadiq and Nasir Butt, were killed in Punjab’s Khanewal district. The men were involved in counter-terrorism efforts in the region. Both the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and an obscure militant group, Lashkar-e-Khorasan (Army of Khorasan, or LeK; also known as Ittehad Mujahideen Khorasan, or United Mujahideen of Khorasan), claimed responsibility for the attack (Dawn, January 5). Similarly, on January 26, LeK also claimed a sectarian killing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Dera Ismail Khan district (The Khorasan Diary, January 26). [1] The reemergence of LeK on Pakistan’s ever-evolving and competitive jihadist landscape after ten years of dormancy coincides with the broader resurgence of terrorism in Pakistan. Other revitalized groups include the TTP, Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, and the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) (Express Tribune, January 5).  The Reemergence of the Jihadist Counter-Intelligence Group in Pakistan: Lashkar-e-Khorasan
  • L’incombente guerra dell’acqua in Asia meridionale (The Strategist, ).  More than six decades ago, the world’s most generous water-sharing pact was concluded. Under the Indus Waters Treaty, upstream India left the lion’s share of the waters from the subcontinent’s six-river Indus system for downstream Pakistan. But repeated Pakistani efforts to use the treaty to disrupt India’s efforts to safeguard its own water security have driven India to rethink its largesse.  South Asia’s looming water war
  • L’ammodernamento delle forze aeree cinesi (IISS). China continues to build more and better combat aircraft as the air force continues to replace ageing aircraft with considerably more capable types: the Chengdu J-10C and J-20 and the Shenyang J-16 are increasingly at the core of Chinese air power.  China’s air force modernisation: gaining pace
  • L’infruttuosa diplomazia di Wang Yi in Europa (The Interpreter, Michael Clarke). China has begun a diplomatic “charm offensive”, a seeming shift from the aggressive “wolf warrior” tone of recent years. Last month, Vice Premier Liu He travelled to Davos for the World Economic Forum to declare to world economic leaders that “foreign investments are welcome in China, and the door to China will only open up further”.  Wang Yi’s fruitless diplomacy in Europe
  • I maggiori centri finanziari asiatici (Hong Kong e Singapore) e le banche centrali estere (in particolare, quella russa) sono i maggiori detentori del debito cinese (Brookings,  Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti). Since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, international investors have shown increased appetite for bonds issued by emerging market and developing economies. The stock of bonds issued by their governments and corporations in the hands of international investors has risen from less than $1 trillion in 2009 to $3.5 trillion in 2021, according to our External Wealth of Nations database. Of particular note is the boom in international holdings of bonds issued by China, which were negligible in 2009 ($9 billion) and reached $788 billion at the end of 2021. In a paper with Katharina Bergant and Martin Schmitz, we show that the largest holders of Chinese debt are Asian financial centers (especially Hong Kong and Singapore) and foreign central banks, including importantly Russia’s. Destinations for portfolio investment in emerging economies: China is different
  • La dipendenza australiana dalle esportazioni cinesi è una realtà economica (East Asia Forum,  James Laurenceson).  The share of Australia’s total goods exports going to China fell to 27 per cent in June 2022, a sharp decrease from 46 per cent just a year earlier. While some commentary has heralded this as a success for Australian diversification away from China, it is more accurately described as a redirection of trade flows.  Australian reliance on Chinese exports an economic reality
  • Negoziati per un accordo di libero scambio tra India e UE (SWP, Hanns Günther HilpertChristian WagnerBettina Rudloff). In summer 2022, the European Union (EU) and India resumed negotiations on a free trade agreement to strengthen their strategic partnership.  Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between India and the EU
  • Gettare i semi della cooperazione UE-ASEAN nel campo della ricerca agricola (East Asia Forum, Darryl Tan, Luzile Satur, Mirjam Le). Over the past few years, ASEAN member states have faced food security issues. The twin crises of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war disrupted food supply chains as it impacted the flow of migrant workers who keep the agricultural sector running and constrained global output of wheat and fertiliser.  Sowing the seeds of EU–ASEAN agricultural research cooperation
  • Il capo dell’ASIO sottolinea l’evoluzione della minaccia terroristica per l’Australia (The Strategist, ). In his 2023 annual threat assessment address, the head of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, Mike Burgess, characterised Australia’s security environment as complex, challenging and changing. Burgess made it unequivocally clear that while threats to life are a priority for ASIO, espionage and foreign interference are now the agency’s principal security concern. But even though the threat of domestic terrorism wasn’t the headline issue, that doesn’t mean it hasn’t evolved over the past year.  ASIO chief highlights evolving terror threat to Australia
  • Australia. Gli operatori delle infrastrutture hanno bisogno di accedere all’intelligence per proteggere i loro beni (The Strategist). Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil launched the government’s ‘critical infrastructure risk management program’ yesterday. The minister is clearly focused on preventing a repeat of last year’s high-profile and publicly contentious hacks of Optus and Medibank. The new program’s broad, all-hazards approach to the resilience of our critical national infrastructure illustrates an enhanced security posture in response to the heightened security threats that Australia now faces.  Infrastructure operators need access to intelligence to protect their assets
  • Reazioni alla guerra in Ucraina: Stati del Golfo, Israele e  Turchia (IISS, Emile Hokayem). Emile Hokayem, IISS Director of Regional Security, assesses the geopolitical significance of the war in a three-part survey of the Middle East.  The Gulf states, Israel and Turkiye: reactions to the war in Ukraine
  • Dobbiamo prepararci alla disgregazione della Russia? (Institut Montaigne, Bruno Tertrais). In the Risk board game, where many baby boomers learned the basics of geostrategy, one could look forever for Russia without finding it. Instead, one would come across Ukraine, Ural, Yakutia, Chita and Kamchatka.  After the Fall. Must We Prepare for the Breakup of Russia?
  • L’invasione russa dell’Ucraina: un anno dopo (Edam, Ali Tuygan).  Two years ago, on February 19, 2021, at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference, President Biden addressed the global community for the first time. He defined the partnership between Europe and the US as the cornerstone of all that the West hopes to accomplish in the 21st century, just as it did in the 20th century. He said, “I know — I know the past few years have strained and tested our transatlantic relationship, but the United States is determined — determined to reengage with Europe, to consult with you, to earn back our position of trusted leadership.”.  Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: One Year on
  • L’Ucraina un anno dopo (CSIS, H. Andrew Schwartz, Max Bergmann, CSIS). CSIS’s Max Bergmann joins the podcast to discuss the one-year anniversary of the Ukraine war, the shape the conflict has taken and the security and economic outcomes in Europe and in Russia because of it.  Ukraine a Year Later
  • Un anno di guerra in Ucraina: le sanzioni contro la Russia fanno la differenza? (Council on Foreign Relations, Noah Berman, Anshu Siripurapu). The United States and its allies have imposed harsh economic penalties on Russia over its war in Ukraine. One year after the invasion began, here’s what they have achieved and where critics say they’ve fallen short.  One Year of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?
  • Le brigate iraniane Fatemiyoun e Zainebiyoun rafforzeranno l’esercito russo in Ucraina? (The Jamestown Foundation, Sine Ozkarasahin). In late December, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced a significant expansion of the Russian Armed Forces that would increase its size from 1.15 million to 1.5 million soldiers. The proposal also includes the establishment of new divisions and the recruitment of an additional 300,000 contract service personnel (Vedomosti, January 17). Although Russian President Vladimir Putin is counting on this internal mobilization to expand its military, he is also considering recruiting foreign fighters. Running low on skilled men in Ukraine, he is turning to other options, such as recruiting former Afghan forces which fought in Syria (, November 24, 2022).  Will Iran’s Fatemiyoun and Zainebiyoun Brigades Reinforce the Russian Army in Ukraine?
  • Aumentano le esportazioni di greggio artico della Russia verso Cina e India (The Jamestown Foundation, Grant W. Turner). On December 5, 2022, the G7, European Union, Canada, Japan and Australia began implementing a $60 price cap on Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports (see EDM, December 5, 2022), which China and India quickly capitalized on. Additional ceilings on petroleum products are expected later this year and are anticipated to have a far greater impact (Economic Times, January 17). In retaliation, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that countries abiding by the price cap and other sanctions will be banned from receiving Russian energy (Economic Times, December 28, 2022).  Russia’s Arctic Crude Exports to China and India Increase
  • La guerra in Ucraina ha raggiunto il culmine politico (The Jamestown Foundation, Pavel K. Baev). As the one-year mark approaches, the Russo-Ukrainian war shows little movement along the battle lines but plenty of action along the political dimension, which may be approaching a culmination point. First came the meeting of Ukraine’s key supporters in the Ramstein format; then the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense ministers, to which Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov was invited; and, over the long weekend, the 2023 Munich Security Conference, which started with a virtual presentation by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (Kommersant, February 17). Countering this political offensive, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered his postponed address to the Federal Assembly on February 21 and asserted, among other things, that “Western elites have become a symbol of total, unprincipled lies” (, February 21).  Before Decisive Battles, Russia’s War Against Ukraine Reaches a Political Culmination
  • La Russia in Ucraina: responsabilità e ordine globale
    sull’orlo del precipizio (The Interpreter, Melinda Rankin). The Munich Security Conference this year took on a new character. The meeting, held last weekend, involving leaders from across Europe and elsewhere debated the greatest international security issues in ways not raised since the Moscow Conference of 1943 and the London Conference of 1945. As the grim anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine loomed, delegates linked the fate of the international order with a call for an end to impunity and a demand for those responsible for atrocity crimes to be held to account.  Russia in Ukraine: accountability and global order on the precipice
  • La guerra in Ucraina ha spostato il focus della Conferenza di Monaco sulle questioni della difesa più che sulle politiche (Breaking Defense, Reuben Johnson). Last week’s Munich Security Conference included call-outs on specific weapon systems, an unusual occurrence at the normally high-minded dialogue.  At Munich Conference, Ukraine drives an unusual focus on acquisition over policy
  • Meloni esclude di dare i vecchi caccia italiani all’Ucraina (Defense News, Tom Kington). Italy’s prime minister has ruled out the dispatch of Italian fighter jets to Ukraine for now, ending days of speculation Rome could send its aging AMX aircraft to help combat Russia’s invasion.  Meloni rules out giving Italy’s old fighter jets to Ukraine
  • Bielorussia. Lukashenko ha annunciato che l’industria della difesa è pronta a dare il via alla produzione di aerei d’attacco  Sukhoi Su-25 (Defense News, Jaroslaw Adamowski). In another sign of tightening defense ties between Belarus and Russia, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has announced his country’s defense industry is ready to kick off the manufacturing of Sukhoi Su-25 ground attack aircraft. Some analysts suggest the move could be related to Moscow’s plan to streamline Minsk’s defense industry capacities towards its war against Ukraine.  Belarus to make Su-25 attack aircraft as Russia eyes industry takeover
  • Secondo l’ex ambasciatore USA nella Federazione Russa, John F. Tefft, il discorso della Russia sul nuovo START è più una tattica di paura che una nuova corsa agli armamenti (Defense One, Patrick Tucker). In a lengthy speech that left many of his supporters nodding off, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced Monday that his country would “suspend” participation in the New START Treaty, the last arms control agreement between Russia and the United States.  Russia’s New START Speech Is More Scare Tactics Than New Arms Race, Says Former Ambassador
  • Russia-Ucraina. Evoluzione della guerra, 21 febbraio 2023 (Institute for the Study of War, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly did not articulate specific goals or intentions for the war in Ukraine, instead reinforcing several long-standing rhetorical lines in an effort to buy Putin more space and time for a protracted war.  Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2023
  • Iran. Evoluzione della crisi, 21 febbraio 2023 (Institute for the Study of War, Kitaneh Fitzpatrick, Nicholas Carl, Annika Ganzeveld, Zachary Coles, Johanna Moore, and Frederick W. Kagan). The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what pattern of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase.  Iran Update, February 21, 2023
  • Riflessioni sulla regolamentazione delle IA generative come ChatGPT (Brookings, Alex Engler). With OpenAI’s ChatGPT now a constant presence both on social media and in the news, generative artificial intelligence (AI) models have taken hold of the public’s imagination. Policymakers have taken note too, with statements from Members addressing risks and AI-generated text read on the floor of the House of Representatives. While they are still emerging technologies, generative AI models have been around long enough to consider what we know now, and what regulatory interventions might best tackle both legitimate commercial use and malicious use.  Early thoughts on regulating generative AI like ChatGPT