- (Intersections) La geopolitica e i portieri di calcio – Geopolitics and football goalkeepers (Marzia Giglioli)
- (Intersections) Nel profondo della terra, oltre le nuvole – Deep in the earth, beyond the clouds (Marco Emanuele)
- (Diplomacy & International Relations) L’analista palestinese Samir Al Qaryouti: l’attacco di Hamas segna la fine degli accordi di Oslo – Palestinian analyst Samir Al Qaryouti: Hamas attack marks the end of the Oslo Accords (Carlo Rebecchi)
- (Diplomacy & International Relations) L’analista israeliano Yossi Bar sull’attacco di Hamas: per tanto terrore non c’è logica o strategia – Israeli analyst Yossi Bar on the Hamas attack: for so much terror there is no logic or strategy (Carlo Rebecchi)
- (Climate Action) The geostrategic importance of a sustainable ‘ocean economy’ to combat climate change. In dialogue with the ‘Ocean Panel’
We are in cooperation with The Science of Where Magazine
Daily from global think tanks (Worlds – Systemic Sustainability)
Worlds (Attack on Israel; Europe-Indonesia; Finland-Sweden; Germany; Gulf Countries; India-China-Sri Lanka; India-Israel; Kazakhstan; Nepal-China; Russia; Russia-Ukraine)
Attack on Israel
- Kiel Institute for the World Economy – Moritz Schularick | Kiel Institute: Terror in Israel: Economic consequences depend on oil price development | Kiel Institute (ifw-kiel.de)
- Richard N. Haas (Project Syndicate – ASPI The Strategist) – An Israeli dilemma | The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au)
- Alexander Palmer, Daniel Byman (Center for Strategic & International Studies) – What’s Next for Hamas and Israel? (csis.org)
- Suzanne Maloney, Natan Sachs, Shibley Telhami, Molly E. Reynolds, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Adrianna Pita (Brookings) – War in Israel and Gaza | Brookings
- Nicholas Blanford (Atlantic Council) – What will Hezbollah do next? Here’s how the Hamas-Israel conflict could engulf the region. – Atlantic Council
- Atlantic Council – Live expertise: Get the latest insight on the Israel-Hamas war – Atlantic Council
- Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum (MENAF) Weekly Strategic Brief (october 10, 2023): Hamas carries out unprecedented attack against Israel, escalating tensions to war; far-reaching consequences for Israeli security policy, regional foreign policy, and domestic politics—In the morning hours of 7th October, the Gaza Strip-based Palestinian terrorist group, Hamas, carried out an unprecedented and surprise attack on Israel, bombing observation towers and weapons systems along the Israel-Gaza Strip border with the use of drones, launching c. 2,200 missiles and multiple armed paragliders into Israel, tearing openings in the border fence and crossing through them as well as through border checkpoints, and deploying motorboats on the Mediterranean Sea.
Some 1,000 Hamas fighters infiltrated army bases and more than 22 towns in the areas surrounding the Gaza Strip, including Ashkelon, Sderot, Be’eri, Kerem Shalom and Ofakim, the latter some 30 kilometres (18 miles) from the border. More than 900 Israelis were killed, including some 70 soldiers, while 2,500 more were injured and an estimated 150 people—both civilians and soldiers—were taken hostage into the Gaza Strip. On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared a war on Hamas and announced the widespread mobilisation of active personnel as well as around 300,000 reservists of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). Israel launched airstrikes on Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip overnight while its ground forces secured the areas affected by the incursion by 9th October. More than 500 people died and nearly 3,000 have been injured in the Gaza Strip since. Simultaneously, mortars were fired and four Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) terrorists breached the fence along the Lebanon-Israel border, who the IDF swiftly stopped before shelling Hezbollah military posts in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah denied its involvement in the attack. On 9th October, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant announced a ‘complete siege’ on the Gaza Strip, cutting off electricity, fuel and food.
In a joint statement on 9th October, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy expressed their support for Israel to defend itself. On the same day U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin announced that the US was moving an aircraft carrier and several warships closer to Israel in the east Mediterranean.
- Hamas’ highly coordinated attack took Israel’s security establishment by complete surprise, resulting in the deadliest incident and the first battles fought on Israeli soil since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, rendering it one of the most serious intelligence and tactical failures in the country’s history. Israel has perceived Hamas to lack the appetite for broader military confrontation, especially since its position of neutrality during Israel’s Operation Shield and Arrow against PIJ militants in the Gaza Strip in May this year. While Israel is likely to carry out its largest offensive operation in decades, the presence of a high number of hostages in the Gaza Strip presents important limits on its usual tactics of air raids, increasing the probability of some form of ground operation over the coming days.
- As Israel’s counteroffensive against the Gaza Strip intensifies, risks of PIJ and Hezbollah militants triggering a two-front war from Lebanon, and Palestinian terrorist attacks taking place in the West Bank and in larger Israeli cities will grow. The repeated meetings of senior Hamas, Hezbollah and PIJ leaders—including Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al-Nakhalah—in Beirut since April, in addition to their separate meetings with Ismail Qaani, Commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, point to a grander anti-Israel scheme at play. Following the earthquake that struck in February, Iran shipped weapons and ammunition to Syria in the guise of aid, potentially reaching Hezbollah and prompting Israeli airstrikes targeting and destroying a Hezbollah military depot in the city of Homs near the Lebanese border in April. This is in addition to Iran’s known and years-long military, logistical and financial support to the PIJ and Hamas too. The US’s swift decision to move its Navy ships despite President Joe Biden’s strained relationship with Netanyahu signals the administration’s concern about the Hamas-Israel war drawing in multiple parties and escalating to a regionwide conflict.
- Israel’s counterattack in the Gaza Strip will inevitably fuel animosity among Arab populations across the Middle East and prompt the further public distancing of their leaders, harming not only Israel’s existing peaceful relations with Arab states but also the developing relationship with Saudi Arabia, which is effectively halted as a direct result of the war in our assessment. The potential of Saudi-Israeli normalisation and recent news of Israeli negotiations with the West Bank-based Palestinian Authority exacerbated Iranian, Hamas, PIJ and Hezbollah threat perceptions, and were in fact among the primary factors that triggered Hamas’ attack. At a Palestinian summit held in Cairo on 30th July, Hamas leader Haniyeh stressed the unique opportunity that Israel’s internal political divisions offered the resistance movement, highlighting the role domestic Israeli politics played in the matter too.
- It is still early to assess how the Netanyahu government will fare once the most immediate threats to Israel’s security have been mitigated. While the war will undeniably unite the country’s population and divert attention away from months-long public protests and political discord associated with the judicial reform plans, the intelligence fiasco and consequent failure to prevent or pre-empt the attack could alone threaten its longevity. The government’s political balance sheet will be influenced by a number of variables over the coming weeks and potentially months, including the extent and means of Israel’s retaliatory actions, the fate of hostages, Hamas’ resilience, Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militant groups’ decision whether to intervene, as well as the pro- and anti-Israel camps’ means and willingness to support either of the conflicting parties.
- Yohanan Tzoreff (INSS) – The West Bank Sympathizes with Hamas – But So Far Has Not Answered its Calls | INSS
Europe – Indonesia
Made Anthony Iswara, Dimitri Swasthika Nurshadrina, Asep Suryahadi (East Asia Forum) scrivono a proposito del nuovo regolamento europeo sulla deforestazione che creerebbe problemi per l’importazione di prodotti che potrebbero impattare sulla deforestazione o sul degrado delle foreste. Gli Autori si concentrano, in particolare, sull’importazione di olio di palma dall’Indonesia
Made Anthony Iswara, Dimitri Swasthika Nurshadrina, Asep Suryahadi (East Asia Forum) write about the new European deforestation regulation that would create problems for the import of products that could impact deforestation or forest degradation. The authors focus, in particular, on the import of palm oil from Indonesia
Finland – Sweden
Karl Dewey (IISS) scrive che Finlandia e Svezia hanno annunciato piani di spesa per la difesa per il 2024 con esborsi più elevati. La Finlandia, che è diventata membro della NATO nell’aprile 2023, ha aumentato il suo bilancio per la difesa per il 2024 a 6,19 miliardi di euro (6,58 miliardi di dollari). La Svezia, che attende ancora il consenso della Turchia e dell’Ungheria per entrare nell’Alleanza, ha stanziato 126 miliardi di corone svedesi (11,83 miliardi di dollari) per il bilancio militare del 2024
Karl Dewey (IISS) writes that Finland and Sweden have announced defence spending plans for 2024 with higher outlays. Finland, which became a NATO member in April 2023, increased its defence budget for 2024 to EUR 6.19 billion (USD 6.58 billion). Sweden, which still awaits the consent of Turkey and Hungary to join the Alliance, allocated SEK 126 billion ($11.83 billion) for its 2024 military budget
Klemens Kober (IFRI) scrive dell’approccio della Germania, in una fase storica di erosione del sistema commerciale globale, per adattare la propria posizione e contribuire a definire una nuova strategia commerciale europea. Il tema è rilevante per la nuova Commissione europea e per il nuovo Parlamento europeo
Klemens Kober (IFRI) writes about Germany’s approach, in a historical phase of erosion of the global trade system, to adapt its position and help define a new European trade strategy. The topic is relevant for the new European Commission and Parliament
Hasan Alhasan e Camille Lons (IISS) scrivono delle strategie geopolitiche dei Paesi del Golfo. Nella regione MENA, gli Stati del Golfo hanno erogato più aiuti di salvataggio rispetto alla maggior parte dei tradizionali donatori bilaterali e multilaterali, compreso il FMI. Si tratta della ‘bailout diplomacy’
Hasan Alhasan and Camille Lons (IISS) write about the geopolitical strategies of the Gulf States. In the MENA region, the Gulf States have provided more bailout aid than most traditional bilateral and multilateral donors, including the IMF. This is ‘bailout diplomacy’
India – China – Sri Lanka
Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan (Observer Research Foundation) scrive a proposito della nave di ricerca Shi Yan 6 nello Sri Lanka, Paese che si muove tatticamente tra Pechino e Nuova Delhi. Siccome, secondo i media, tra il 2019 e il 2023, 48 navi di ricerca scientifica cinesi hanno attraccato nella regione dell’Oceano Indiano, il problema diventa sostanziale per l’India
Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan (Observer Research Foundation) writes about the research ship Shi Yan 6 in Sri Lanka, a country that moves tactically between Beijing and New Delhi. Since, according to media reports, 48 Chinese scientific research ships docked in the Indian Ocean region between 2019 and 2023, the problem becomes substantial for India
India – Israel
Manjari Chatterjee Miller (Council on Foreign Relations) descrive l’evoluzione dei rapporti tra India e Israele
Manjari Chatterjee Miller (Council on Foreign Relations) describes the evolution of relations between India and Israel
Misha Monteiro-Benson (East Asia Forum) scrive che, con tutte le difficoltà legate alla stretta sull’immigrazione da parte del governo, l’afflusso di immigrati in Kazakhstan dalla Russia dopo l’inizio della guerra in Ucraina continua a essere un fattore positivo per l’economia del Paese
Misha Monteiro-Benson (East Asia Forum) writes that, with all the difficulties associated with the government’s tightening of immigration, the influx of immigrants to Kazakhstan from Russia after the start of the war in Ukraine continues to be a positive factor for the country’s economy
Nepal – China
Hari Bansh Jha (Observer Research Foundation) scrive della recente visita del Primo Ministro nepalese a Pechino e degli accordi firmati tra i due Paesi. L’Autore sottolinea le criticità di tale partnership, dalla contesa sulle mappe geografiche al limitato impatto dei grandi progetti infrastrutturali sullo sviluppo del Nepal
Hari Bansh Jha (Observer Research Foundation) writes about the Nepalese Prime Minister’s recent visit to Beijing and the agreements signed between the two countries. The author points out the critical aspects of this partnership, from the dispute over geographical maps to the limited impact of large infrastructure projects on Nepal’s development
Richard Arnold (The Jamestown Foundation) scrive che i cosacchi svolgono e continueranno a svolgere un ruolo importante nella mobilitazione segreta della Russia per la guerra in Ucraina
Richard Arnold (The Jamestown Foundation) writes that Cossacks play and will continue to play an important role in Russia’s covert mobilisation for the war in Ukraine
Ksenia Kirillova (The Jamestown Foundation) scrive delle difficoltà, per l’opposizione russa all’estero, di incidere per il cambiamento nel proprio Paese
Ksenia Kirillova (The Jamestown Foundation) writes about the difficulties for the Russian opposition abroad to affect change in their country
Pavel K. Baev (The Jamestown Foundation) scrive della complessità della retorica russa sul tema delle armi nucleari
Pavel K. Baev (The Jamestown Foundation) writes about the complexity of Russian rhetoric on the subject of nuclear weapons
Russia – Ukraine
Daily report, Institute for the Study of War (Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, and Mason Clark) – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 10, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)
Systemic Sustainability (Global Energy and Transition; Global Trade)
Global Energy and Transition
Amin Saikal (ASPI The Strategist) scrive che, finché esisterà l’allineamento di interessi tra Arabia Saudita e Russia, è improbabile che il prezzo del petrolio scenda rapidamente, a meno che non si verifichi una marcata riduzione del consumo globale
Amin Saikal (ASPI The Strategist) writes that as long as the alignment of interests between Saudi Arabia and Russia exists, oil prices are unlikely to fall rapidly unless there is a marked reduction in global consumption
King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Centre presenta uno studio di valutazione dell’allineamento dei flussi finanziari sostenibili globali con le priorità di investimento della transizione. Gli Autori notano che la dimensione dei finanziamenti ambientali, sociali e di governance (ESG) a livello globale rimane bassa. In particolare, i Paesi in via di sviluppo ricevono solo una piccola parte dei fondi ESG globali
King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Centre presents a study assessing the alignment of global sustainable finance flows with transition investment priorities. The authors note that the scale of environmental, social and governance (ESG) financing globally remains low. In particular, developing countries receive only a small proportion of global ESG funds
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe (IFRI) scrive delle previsioni globali di declino dell’utilizzo del carbone
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe (IFRI) writes about global predictions of declining coal use
Vincent Stamer, responsabile del Kiel Trade Indicator (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), ha dichiarato che ‘dopo che i valori commerciali dell’indicatore commerciale di Kiel erano risultati sorprendentemente positivi ad agosto, ora puntano di nuovo verso il basso per i flussi commerciali di settembre. La contromossa al ribasso è particolarmente pronunciata in Germania’.
Vincent Stamer, head of the Kiel Trade Indicator (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), stated that ‘after the trade values of the Kiel Trade Indicator had turned out surprisingly positive for August, they are now pointing sideways again for the September trade flows. The downward countermovement is particularly pronounced in Germany’.